I am going to cite an example which will point out the necessity for having a master plan in case of disaster. In the March issue of the Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n Bulletin, an article appeared entitled "San Francisco Revisited: Second Ordeal by Fire," by Dr. Emil Leland, Chairman, ACCMA Disaster Committee.
On May 23, 1964, a parish hall caught fire, killing five persons and sending ninety-six more to hospitals where twelve died later from burns. The incident was serious enough for the mayor to proclaim it an "official" disaster. Twenty-three ambulances, many police cars and even municipal buses were necessary to take the injured to the hospitals. Practically all the casualties were burns, half of them estimated at 25 percent of body area. Cutter Laboratory was alerted-sent two and one-half tons of plasma and LV. fluids to San Francisco General Hospital, which acted as distributing center for other hospitals.
Fortunately Dr. Harry Zehner, Jr., at that time 
E mergency, by way of
Webster's definition, is a sudden, generally unexpected occurrence or set of circumstances demanding immediate action.
There are three categories of emergencies that come to my mind: (1) accidents, (2) sudden illness, (3) emotional upsets.
Essentially all three can be approached in the same manner. The nurse should evaluate each case and decide what can be done in each particular situation, in a manner which is best for the patient. The nurse must be aware that her conduct should have a calming effect on the patient and any other individuals who happen to be around. By her firmness and poise, she can readily capture attention and avert panic. Yet she can be kind and understanding.
Weare all acquainted with the uninvolved and uncomplicated accident. The routine procedure is followed. The first-aid crew goes to the scene, it has alerted the nurse who calls the physician. The nurse takes care of the necessary things, controlling bleeding, cleaning and dressing wounds. She also assigns duties to the spectators-a good one is calling the ambulance, if necessary, so it will be ready when the physician releases the patient. This is the uncomplicated. case, whether it be a fracture, a severe burn or a hemorrhage. It is uncomplicated because we have one case, perhaps two or at the most three. But where chaos can occur is when there are a large number of injuries. How well prepared are we? In the simple accident the patient has received the best care possible because of good Chief Surgical Resident, was on duty that night. Only shortly before, on his own initiative, he had rewritten the hospital's disaster plan as a subject for surgical rounds. Prior to this the house staff had no knowledge of a plan for disaster.
The first forty-five to fifty casualties were rushed to San Francisco General where the emergency room was soon overtaxed. Triage was rapidly effected and eight or nine tracheotomies performed An interne or medical student was assigned to each patient. Roving nurses had single duties-one nurse for narcotics, one for dressings and another for charting. Dr. Zehner considered himself lucky to have had a plan of action clearly in mind before the fire.
St. Luke's hospital was different. There was no up-to-date disaster plan and no concept of triage.
Although not designed to take care of a large number of emergencies, the hospital found itself forced to take care of the same number of casualties that had already saturated San Francisco General's capacity. The problem was worsened by the fact that no one had notified St. Luke's that it was to receive casualties. Dr. Peter Bouderes was in charge; teams went to work to change bedlam into more organized effort. Fluids and narcotics were administered by LV., leaving cut-downs unsutured to prevent infection. They inserted catheters. They performed seven to eight tracheotomies. They dressed no burns until they had completed the more important emergency measures. Where necessary, they even transferred patients without dressings-but not without starting plasma and clearing the airways.
In spite of all the problems, St. Luke's fared rather well because: (1) Dr. Bouderes had triage experience (his first) at another hospital just two months before; (2) all injuries were the same type, permitting standardized treatment; (3) the fire happened at a time of night when nursing shifts were changing, thus doubling the available personnel; (4) recent construction had placed the central supply unit along the same corridor as the un.ts for surgery, intensive care and recovery; (5) the Samoan patients and their relatives were unusually composed, which prevented more confusion; and (6) the hospital's School of Nursing provided additional needed personnel.
After reading this article, I reread our Refinery's own Disaster Plan. It appeared to me that nothing was overlooked-not even unannounced practice drills.
I also wondered if the hospitals in this area had a disaster program. I called the administrator of Brookside Hospital, to check on a newspaper article which had appeared in a local paper. A patient's husband had called him for permission to .visit his wife by helicopter. The administrator agreed, deciding to make a disaster drill of the affair. It worked 18 surprisingly well. Now the hospital is working on bringing the plan up to date and regular drills are scheduled.
In the refinery where I work, we have a plant physician only in the mornings. However, he readily responds to emergency calls, and if he is not available, there are three other physicians in our town who are acquainted with our Refinery and know, far better than I, the locations of the units. They are acquainted with the plant hospital and our physician has written standing orders for us to follow until he can reach us.
If I worked in an industry with no plant physician, I would first discuss with management the need for some emergency setup. Then I would contact the neighboring physicians, invite them to see the plant hospital and ask for suggestions. Above all, I would have some sort of agreement with them about responding to an emergency phone call from my plant.
In our emergency plan, our first-aid crew has available two resuscitators, plastic redi-splints, and tourniquets. In the plant hospital, we have as many of the tubex stimulants as are available. They save time and there is no need to fuss about drawing a drug up into a syringe in an emergency. For a tourniquet, we use bloodpressure cuffs and the pressure held steady by means of a good-sized clamp. We have available steristrips in various sizes, a suture set which is simple but adequate for a debridement and some minor surgery. We have a tracheotomy set, a large tank of oxygen, two small tanks and two small tanks of carbogen. We also have an electrocardiogram machine.
Our standing orders for sudden illness are welldefined. If a patient comes to us with chest pain, we routinely use oxygen. If it is a coronary, pain may be relieved and breathing will be made easier. If it is not, no harm is done. Because of the many coronaries we have had at our Refinery, our men are so conditioned that the oxygen mask is not in the least alarming. We still do explain the purpose of the oxygen. If possible, and it is not too distressing to the patient, we will take an ECG. While we are busy with the patient, someone is calling the plant physician and summoning the ambulance. Thus little time elapses before the patient is on his way to the hospital. A record of the time the patient arrived in the plant hospital, his blood. pressure, time and kind of injections given and any known allergies is made. This is sent to the hospital with the patient and an ECG if one has been taken.
All in all, our most valuable weapons in dealing with emergencies and pain are accurate communications and well-planned programs. With proper communications a nurse can manage a problem with less guess-work and gain the confidence of everyone.
